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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Appellee adopts the Jurisdictional Statement of Appellant.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
An Order issued by the trial court in the form of a Minute Entry on April 15, 2008,
found Appellant Fay "had absolutely no legal or factual basis for involving Todd Rodgers
in this action and asserting a claim against him." The trial court found that Fay had violated
Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and held him liable for Mr. Rodgers' fees and
costs incurred in defending Fay's claims. Based upon the October 7, 2008, Minute
Entry/Order, the trial court entered Judgment against Fay in the amount of $6,301.10, interest
accruing at 6.99% until paid. Appellant filed notice of appeal on November 5, 2008.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
See Statement of Issues, Infra.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"[T]he standard of review for evaluating the denial or imposition of Rule 11 sanctions
involves a three-tiered approach: '(1) findings of fact are reviewed under the clearly
erroneous standard; (2) legal conclusions are reviewed under the correction of error standard;
and (3) the type and amount of sanctions to be imposed [are] reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard.'5'

See Morse v. Packer, 2000 UT 86, ^{16, 15 P.3d 1021 (Utah

2000)(Morse v. Packer, 1999 UT 5, f 10, 973 P.2d 422 (citing Barnard v. Sutliff 846 P.2d
1229, 1234 (Utah 1992))).
1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Whether the trial court properly sanctioned Fay for his failure to make an

objectively reasonable inquiry before filing his Complaint, and his failure to dismiss the
allegations despite what he learned thereafter.
2.

Whether the trial court properly found that Fay failed to make an objectively

reasonable inquiry as to any connection between Rodgers' and Global Travel before filing
his Complaint.
3.

Whether the trial court properly supported its legal conclusions with

sufficiently specific findings of fact.
4.

Whether the law required the trial court to offset the sanctions awarded to Mr.

Rodgers (his attorney's fees) under the mitigation-of-damages doctrine because Mr. Rodgers
failed to file a dispositive motion earlier.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
On January 5, 2006, Appellant filed a Complaint for damages in the Third District

Court, naming Global Travel Network, Todd Rodgers, and Does 1 through 10 as
Defendants. R 1-12. On January 24, 2008, the trial court granted Rodgers' Motion and
dismissed him from the law suit. R 401.
On February 29, 2008, Mr. Rodgers filed a Motion for Sanctions under Rule 11. R
402-13. Fay filed a Memorandum in Opposition on March 17, 2008. R 414-33. On
March 28, 2008, Mr. Rodgers filed a Response, a Request for Oral Argument, and a
2

Request to Submit for Decision. R 434-48. In a Minute Entry dated April 15, 2008, the
trial court granted Rodgers' Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions . R 454-57. On October 7,
2008, the trial court entered Judgment against Fay in the amount of $6,301.10, with
interest at 6.99 percent until paid. R 535-36. Appellant Fay filed notice of appeal on
November 5, 2008. R 537-38.
B.

Statement of Relevant Facts
Fay claims that he contacted the Utah Attorney General's Office after receiving

two fraudulent telephone solicitations in late November 2004. (R 3, 427). Appellant
contacted the Defendants in December of 2004. (R 5).
Appellant asserts that the state investigator told him that Todd Rodgers was the
contact person for Global Travel Network and was representing Global in the state
investigation. According to Appellant, he was told to deal directly with Rodgers. (R
427).l
In paragraph five of his Affidavit, filed on March 4, 2008, Fay also claims that,
"At that time and at all subsequent times, I understood that Rodgers was 'Global' or the
person with total authority to represent Global in all its dealings with me, and the state
investigators." (R 427). Paragraph seven of Fay's Affidavit alleges that Rodgers signed
all communications from Global to him (R 427), and paragraph nine, that Rodgers signed
a settlement agreement. (R 428).

1

Rodgers notes there is no non-hearsay support for this self-serving assertion in the record. Appellant identified a
record from the Attorney General's Office he apparently intended to introduce as an exhibit. The record shows the
exhibit was not received. (R 450).

3

On February 22, 2005, Mr. Rodgers" counsel sent a letter to Fay expressing
concern over the allegations of intentional representation and fraud made against
Maddox's client, Global Travel Network, and requesting the facts supporting those
allegations. (R 509-510.)
On February 24,2005, Rodgers sent a letter to Fay on Global Travel Network
letterhead. The signature block lists Todd Rodgers as the Western District Manager. (R
511.)
In June of 2005, "Global Travel Network, [Global] and John F. Fay [FAY],"
signed a settlement agreement. (R 41.) This agreement states that "Rodgers affirms he
has authority to bind Global in this agreement." Rodgers signed it "for GLOBAL
TRAVEL NETWORK." (R 42.)

The parties identified in the agreement are Global

Travel Network and John F. Fay. All of the actions to be taken in the Settlement
Agreement are to be taken by either Global or Fay. Global is either to provide funds to
Fay or to reimburse him upon receiving proof of expenditures. Fay is bound to provide
such proof. The agreement does not require Rodgers to do anything. Rodgers5
participation does not go beyond signing the agreement.
Rodgers is not a party to the agreement. It is Global Travel Network that is acting
through Rodgers, not Rodgers acting through Global Travel Network. The Agreement
also states, "In consideration for the above benefits, FAY will not prosecute a civil
lawsuit against Global." Rodgers is not mentioned at all, as potentially liable or as a
potential defendant. (R42.)
4

Appellant Fay (R 1-10) filed his Complaint in the trial court on January 5, 2006.
In paragraph three of his Complaint, Appellant, an active member of the Utah State Bar,
states, "Plaintiff believes Defendant Rogers [sic] is a principle of Defendant Global." (R
2.) Fay made this assertion despite his acknowledgement, in paragraph two of his
Complaint, that he was ignorant as to the organizational structure of Global. (R 1.) He
knew how to contact Global, as is evident in paragraph 16 of his Complaint. (R 5.) He
knew Mr. Rodgers was the Western District Manager of Global. (R 511.)
On January 28, 2006, Scott Nichols, President of Global Travel Network, sent
Appellant a letter on company letterhead regarding the possible settlement of the matter.
The letterhead lists Global's address in Murray, Utah. Among other things, the letter
states,
Since Mr. Rodgers does not have signatory privileges on the corporate bank
account, and in order to prevent any future delays, for demands of payment
on your part, I prefer to prepay the balance of your anticipated charges
previously identified. I expect that this will put this matter to rest. If you
find this satisfactory, cash the enclosed check, enjoy your vacation, and we
will both agree that all your disputes with Global Travel Network are
completely resolved. If you do not find this agreeable, please direct all
future correspondence to me personally.
(R 58.) This letter, and the attached check in the amount of $3,640.82, dated January 28,
2006, were from Mr. Scott Nichols, not Mr. Rodgers. Fay even acknowledges this in
paragraph four of his Plaintiffs List of Trial Witnesses and Exhibits : "Letter to John Fay
from Scott Nichols (encloses check $3,640.82)." (R 357.) The letter and check (R 427)

5

show that someone other than Mr. Rodgers had signed a communication with Fay,
contrary to his assertion that only Rodgers had signed communications with him.
On September 6, 2007, Fay deposed Mr. Scott Nichols. In that deposition, Mr.
Nichols stated that Global Travel Network is a dba of Speakers Consulting Inc., a
Michigan corporation of which Mr. Nichols is a principal. Speakers Consulting, Inc.,
owns Global Travel Network.
Mr. Rodgers was also deposed on September 6, 2007. He stated his job title with
Global Travel Network as Western District Manager. Fay was informed of this in Mr.
Rodgers' letter of February 24, 2005. (R 511.) Mr. Rodgers' had been a sales person, a
manager, and general manager at Global. (R 334.) Fay took the September 6, 2007,
deposition approximately 16 months prior to opposing Mr. Rodgers' motion to be
dismissed from the case.
In Appellant's Memorandum opposing Mr. Rodgers' Motion to Dismiss, Fay
acknowledged that Global is a dba of a Michigan corporation; that Mr. Rodgers is an
employee, not an officer; that all of Mr. Rodgers' actions on behalf of Global were
performed as an employee; that Mr. Rodgers did not make the original telephone call, but
only provided the script used by the telemarketers who did make the call. ( R371-2). As
for Rodgers' assertion that the script requested those called to attend a 90-minute
presentation, Fay does not dispute it. Rather, he says it "[m]ay be correct, but is
ambiguous and unclear, irrelevant and lacking foundation." (R 372). Despite all of this

6

knowledge, Appellant remained obdurate in his opposition to Rodgers' being dismissed
from the suit.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant's brief does not comply with the requirements of Rule 24 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Fay makes no attempt to marshal the evidence. Had he
done so, he would have produced the facts set forth above. While he cites cases, he does
so with little or no analysis applying the principles thereof to the facts he should have
marshaled in this case.
Appellant did not make an objectively reasonable inquiry before filing his
Complaint against Rodgers. Had he done so, he would have known that Rodgers was an
employee of a dba of a Michigan corporation— Speakers Consulting Inc.—and simply
acting within the scope of his employment as the Western District Manager of Global.
Although Fay failed to marshal the evidence (and did not, in fact, even attempt in
good faith to do so), the evidence supports the trial court's finding "[T]hat there is
absolutely no evidentiary support for the Plaintiffs claims that he understood Mr.
Rodgers to be 'Global for all intents and purposes.'" (Minute Entry, FL 454-5). The trial
court also found that "[M]r. Rodgers was not a party to the contract at issue in this case."
(Minute Entry, R 455). That finding is consistent with the contract, which does not list
Mr. Rodgers as a party. (R 42-2).
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding Mr. Rodgers attorney fees.
Had Fay made the objectively reasonable inquiry he was duty bound to make, Mr.
7

Rodgers would never have been named as a party defendant. Appellant was well aware
that Mr. Rodgers was not a party to the contract, but was merely acting on behalf of
Global
At numerous points along the way, Fay ought to have recognized his error and
dismissed his allegations against Mr. Rodgers. Instead, rather than withdraw his specious
allegations, he compounds insult with injury by insisting on presenting them yet again in
an appeal. This by itself justifies affirmation of the trial court's award of sanctions as
well as assessing Mr. Rodgers' costs in defending himself from these spurious claims
once again on appeal.
ARGUMENT
1.

APPELLANT'S APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO
MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE.
The duty to marshal evidence in support of a trial court's finding of fact appears in

Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9) as well as Utah case law:
The marshaling process is not unlike becoming the devil's advocate.
Counsel must extricate himself or herself from the client's shoes and fully
assume the adversary's position. In order to properly discharge the duty of
marshaling the evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial
which supports the very findings the appellant resists. After constructing
this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out
a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient to
convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the
evidence is clearly erroneous.
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

8

Rather than constructing the mandated "magnificent array of supporting evidence,"
Fay, simply makes the self-serving, unsupported assertion "that any effort to marshal the
evidence in support of such limited findings would be futile." (Appellant's Brief at page
17, (quoting Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635 (Ut.App. 1995)). Fay then attempts to
excuse his non-compliance by asserting that, "The trial court's findings are so incomplete,
so conclusory, so lacking in requisite detail, that any effort to marshall [sic] the evidence
in support of such limited findings would be futile." (Appellant's Brief, pg. 17). It is,
however, for this Court to determine the sufficiency of the trial court's findings, not Fay.
Moreover, an examination of the record reveals that Fay's summary dismissal of the
marshaling mandate is presumptuous, and his assertion that the trial court's findings are
insufficient, false. Had he marshaled the evidence, he would have found the facts fatal to
his claims, from the filing of his Complaint to pursuing this appeal.
Briefly, Fay filed a Complaint without bothering to ascertain the nature of Global.
(Complaint, paragraph one (R 1).) Despite this ignorance, he asserts that Mr. Rodgers
was a principal of Global, although he acknowledges not knowing the nature of Global.
(Complaint, paragraph two (R 2).) Before filing the Complaint, Fay had received a letter
from Mr. Rodgers on Global Travel Network letterhead in which the signature block
declares Mr. Rodgers the Western District Manager of the company. (R 511). This title
does not suggest that one is a company principal. Fay had signed a settlement agreement
with Global—not Mr. Rodgers—that states that Mr. Rodgers had been authorized to bind
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Global cin this agreement." Mr. Rodgers signed the settlement agreement uon behalf of
Global Travel Network." (R 42).
Appellant Fay, however, does not marshal these facts, nor does he point out how or
why the trial court's legal conclusions based thereupon are in error. The only
"marshaling" Fay has done is to repeat such evidence as he believes to support his
position. This is not what is required:
[Presenting evidence supporting the challenged conclusion does not satisfy
the marshaling requirement. ... [All Fay] has done instead is "merely re-argue
the factual case ... presented in the trial court," leaving [Mr. Rodgers] and this
court to bear the expense and time of performing the critical task of marshaling
the evidence. This is unfair, inefficient, and unacceptable.
United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35,
126, 140 P.3d 1200 (quoting Chen v. Stewart
Appellant cannot merely present evidence he believes supports his position.
He is to marshal evidence supporting the trial court's decision. He did not do so.
For this reason alone, Appellant Fay's Brief should be stricken and his appeal
dismissed.
2.(A) THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE NOT CLEARLY
ERRONEOUS.
The Utah Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that:
[A] trial court's findings of fact will not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932,935-36 (Utah 1994). In order to establish
that a particular finding of fact is clearly erroneous, f,[a]n appellant must marshal
the evidence in support of the findings and then demonstrate that despite this
10

evidence, the trial court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the
clear weight of the evidence." In re Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah
1989) (internal quotations omitted). If the evidence is inadequately marshaled,
this court assumes that all findings are adequately supported by the evidence. In
re Estate ofBeesley, 883 P.2d 1343, 1349 (Utah 1994).
Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82,1J19, 100 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004). As recently
noted by this Court, a finding is clearly erroneous if it is "'against the clear weight of
the evidence' or lead[s] us to 'a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made,'" State v. Keener, 2008 UT App 288, f l l , 191 P.3d 835 (quoting State v.
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).
The trial court found Rodgers was an employee of Global Travel Network. It
found Rodgers was involved in resolving Appellant's complaints with Global and
signed a settlement agreement with Appellant on behalf of Global. The trial court
ultimately found that,
[TJhere is absolutely no evidentiary support for the Plaintiffs claims
that he understood Mr. Rodgers to be 'Global for all intents and
purposes.' Indeed, it is clear from the Plaintiffs opposition and his
Affidavit that he understood throughout these proceedings that Mr.
Rodgers was merely representing Global Travel Network.
(Minute entry, pages one and two, emphasis added (R 454-456).) Not only are these
findings not against the clear weight of the evidence, they are, instead, clearly upheld and
supported by evidence Fay has completely ignored and left unmarshalled.
Where, as here, a plaintiff admits that he does not know the nature of Global,
(Complaint, paragraph one (R 1), an objectively reasonable inquiiy, particularly for a
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member of the Utah Bar, would be to go to the Utah Department of Commerce website's
index of business entities and look it up. It would have been a matter of only a few moments
to complete such a search, disclosing GlobaPs type and place of business, its principals, and
its registered agent. Notwithstanding the ease with which this information may be obtained,
there is no evidence Fay took this simple step nor made any such inquiry.
Fay had letters from GlobaPs attorney, David Maddox, as well as from Mr. Rodgers
himself. Mr. Rodgers' letter was on Global Travel Network letterhead. Yet Fay produces no
evidence that he had done even the most rudimentary investigation, therefore apparently
never asked either Mr. Maddox or Mr. Rodgers what the nature of Global was, or what role
or position Mr. Rodgers held. Again, based upon the lack of assertion to the contrary, it
appears that Fay didn't bother to even ask Murray City (where GlobaPs main office is
located) whether it had issued Global a business licence and if so, in what business capacity.
Fay's whole inquiry into Mr. Rodgers' position at Global—belying Fay's status as an
active member of the Utah State Bar—apparently consisted of nothing more than the
uninformed assumption that he did not know the nature of Global, but, whatever it was,
Rodgers was its principal. (Complaint at R 2 and 3.) This is not anything like "objectively
reasonable inquiry"; this is not even subjectively reasonable inquiry. Fay made no inquiry
at all beyond an apparent, "Who can I name as a defendant in the hope someone will be
ordered to pay me?"
The trial court found that Mr. Rodgers was an employee of Global, that he was involved
in resolving certain issues between Global and Fay, and that he had signed a settlement
12

agreement uon behalf of Global Travel Network." (Minute Entry (R 454); see also R.42, the
settlement agreement.) Mr. Rodgers signed the June 2005 agreement "for" Global, not "as"
Global, the agreement itself declaring that Mr. Rodgers had authority to bind Global "in this
agreement," not in all agreements or as a principal. This use of "for" and the phrase "in this
agreement" does not support Fay's assertion that he understood Mr. Rodgers to be Global
for all intents and purposes, and the trial court properly and specifically rejected Fay's
assertions to the contrary. The trial court rightly determined that the reasonable inference to
draw from the phrase was that Rodgers' authority, as an employee, was limited to signing
that particular agreement.
2(B) CORRESPONDENCE FROM RODGERS AND MR. MADDOX PUT FAY ON
NOTICE AS TO RODGERS9 ROLE BEFORE FAY FILED HIS COMPLAINT,
As already noted above, before filing his Complaint, Fay had been in possession of
letters putting him on notice that Rodgers was not a principal, but an employee with limited
authority. One such letter was from Mr. David Maddox (counsel for Rodgers and Global),
dated February 22, 2005 (R 509-510), and another letter was from Rodgers himself, dated
February 24,2005. (R 511). Both of these letters pre-date the filing of the complaint by Fay
by several months. Fay actually refers to them both in his brief. (Appellant's Brief at X.)
Mr. Maddox's letter informed Fay. "Mr. Rogers indicates to me that he is more than
willing to provide you the trip that you were entitled to when you were called by this third
party." This shows the alleged fraudulent statements were made by a third party. No basis
is ever given as to why the Rodgers is liable for the statement. Appellant, unfortunately
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(though unsurprisingly), does not marshal that statement, nor does he demonstrate that the
trial court erroneously concluded it was consistent with Mr. Rodgers being an employee
rather than a principal of Global.
The signature block of Mr. Rodgers' letter—written on Global Travel Network
letterhead—identifies him as the Global5s Western District Manager. It does not name him
as President, Vice President, CEO, COO, Secretary/Treasurer, or any other title suggesting
that Mr. Rodgers was more than an employee. Indeed, one could reasonably infer from the
title "Western District Manager" that there is at least one other district with a manager over
it. Appellant Fay's Trial Counsel drew the same inference, that Rodgers was an employee
and that there could be several managers, as illustrated by the following line of questioning
in his deposition of Mr. Rodgers:
In response to a question relating to his position with Global, Mr. Rodgers said his job
title was "District Manager. Western District Manager." The next question trial counsel for
Fay was, " [sic] there more than one district [sic] of Global Travel Network?" (R 334).
Again, however, Fay does not show why the multiple districts inferred by Fay's counsel
during the deposition should not have been inferred by himself before filing his Complaint.
Nor, again, does he show why the trial court erred when it relied on this evidence in support
of its conclusion that Mr. Rodgers was an employee, not a principal. What is more, Fay does
not show, in light of this evidence, that there was clear error on the trial court's part in its
rejecting Fay's conclusion that Mr. Rodgers "[i]s Global for all intents and purposes."

14

Even without the signature block, though, the text of Mr. Rodgers* letter makes a very
clear distinction between Rodgers personally and his employer, Global Travel Network. He
uses u we r when talking about Global's attitude or obligations, such as, "we will be happy
. . .," or "we will absolutely confirm . . .'\ He then uses "I" when talking about what he
would do personally, such as "I will personally assist you with these arrangements,...," or
"I will be glad to assist you . . ."). The distinction is obvious. Todd Rodgers is not Global
but rather he is its employee. Yet again, Fay does not analyze this evidence, nor show how
the trial court misunderstood it.2
2 (C)

NICHOLS' LETTER MAKES RODGERS ROLE AS AN EMPLOYEE
CLEAR.
The Fay Complaint calls Global an entity with an unknown organizational structure.

(R. 1) Thus, given his admitted ignorance of GlobaPs nature when he filed his Complaint,
Fay could not possibly assert, in good faith, that Rodgers "is Global for all intents and
purposes." Paragraph three of Appellant's Complaint also states, "Further, Plaintiff believes
Defendant Rogers [sic] is a principal of Defendant Global." (R 2). As "principal" is
commonly understood to be a person responsible for directing the actions of a corporation
and its employees.
2

There is only one statement in Mr. Rodgers' letter that can be twisted, if taken out of context, to fit Fay's interpretation.
Mr. Rodgers letter states, "In the event of legal pursuit I may take against unauthorized persons making alleged
representations on behalf of my company . . ." Fay would have this Court read this language, "In the event of legal
pursuit I may take..." as a claim to headship of Global Travel Network. However, he then states he would do so "on
behalf of my company...". Given the numerous indicia of mere employee status and the use of the phrase "my company"
as a reference to who he works for, this reading is untenable. Employees often refer to "my company" despite their
having no control over it or its activities. It also makes sense that, if Mr. Rodgers' responsibilities included drafting the
script for the telemarketers, it would also be within the scope of his employment to deal with deviation from that script
in breach of the contract they had with Global.
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Appellant Fay does not marshal these facts, nor indeed, hardly any others. Instead, Fay
expects this Court to accept the notion that he had no idea what Global was, but that he was
nevertheless justified in concluding that, whatever Global was, it was in fact Mr. Todd
Rodgers, and that, despite the entire absence of any evidence whatsoever in support of this
bizarre inference, the conclusion of the trial court to the contrary was somehow clearly
erroneous.
Fay's position is also inconsistent with what he had learned from the letter sent to him
by Mr. Scott Nichols. (R 58.) Approximately three weeks after filing the Complaint,
Appellant received a letter from Mr. Nichols. The letter clearly identified Nichols as the
President of Global Travel Network. The letter also informed Fay that Mr. Rodgers did not
have authority to sign on the corporate account, and it also informed Appellant that future
communications should be directed to Scott Nichols, not Todd Rodgers.
Several things are apparent here: Global is a corporation; Nichols is its President; it
is Nichols, not Rodgers, with whom Fay was asked to deal; and Rodgers does not have
signing authority. (Nichols letter, R 58.) Unlike corporate officers, who routinely have
signing authority on accounts, Mr. Rodgers had no such signing authority on the account.
Id. Mr. Rodgers authority was plainly limited to signing the June 2005 agreement, which
fact is specifically stated in the agreement itself ("Rodgers affirms he has authority to
bind Global in this agreement"). (Emphasis added). ( R 42.) This letter was sent within
weeks of the filing of the Complaint by Fay, yet he persists in including Rodgers as a
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defendant for over 2 years and opposes the Motion for Summary Judgement filed
approximately 23 months later!
Notwithstanding this information, Fay continued his remorseless pursuit of Mr.
Rodgers. Fay never amended his Complaint, in which he had said that he did not know
the nature of Global, nor did he in any way demonstrate taking any reasonable steps to
learn the nature of Global. He remained, instead, focused on his pursuit of Mr. Rodgers.
Even after depositions reaffirmed that Mr. Rodgers was an employee rather than a
principal (R 334), and that Global was a dba of a Michigan corporation (R 333), Fay
continued his single-minded—albeit completely erroneous—pursuit of Todd Rodgers.
Fay's Memorandum opposing the Motion to Dismiss acknowledges that Global is a
dba of a Michigan corporation; that Mr. Rodgers is its employee, not one of its officers;
that all of his actions on behalf of Global were undertaken as an employee; that Mr.
Rodgers did not make the original telephone call, but only provided the script used by the
telemarketers who did; and that the script stated persons were asked to attend a 90-minute
presentation. (R 372, 414, and 420.) Despite this knowledge, Appellant Fay remained
obstinately unwilling to agree to Rodgers' dismissal from the suit. This is exactly what
the trial court referred to when it ruled that Fay understood throughout the proceedings
that Rodgers was merely representing Global Travel Network. (R 455)
Fay seeks to convince this Court that the trial court's authority to impose Rule 11
sanctions is limited to what he knew, or should have known following an objectively
reasonable inquiry, at the time he filed the Complaint. Paradoxically, though, Fay never
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engaged in any objectively reasonable inquiry. Instead, he began his pursuit of Mr.
Rodgers without having bothered to make reasonable inquiry of any sort, objective or
otherwise. He then continued relentlessly pursuing Rodgers and pointedly ignoring what
an objectively reasonable inquiry would have revealed once it was made clear to him by
letters and responses to discovery, such as the deposition referenced previously. This
makes it clear that not only that no amount of objectively reasonable inquiry prior to
filing his Complaint would have dissuaded Appellant Fay from his course but that he
would pursue the matter even after the facts he should have inquired about were presented
to him on several occasions. These facts support the trial court's conclusion that Rodgers
was not Global, and that Appellant knew it and chose to ignore it.
The trial court also found no evidence to support Appellant Fay's claims that Mr.
Rodgers breached a contract or engaged in fraud. (R 455.) As the court noted, and as is
clear from the contract itself, Mr. Rodgers was not a party to the contract. The contract is
between Global and Fay, the Appellant. Mr. Rodgers signed the contract for Global, not
as Global. The contract plainly states that Mr. Rodgers had authority to sign the contract,
nothing more.
The trial court noted that Fay never alleged that Mr. Rodgers was the alter ego of
Global, or that Rodgers had benefited in any way from the alleged misrepresentations of
the telemarketers. The trial court said, "Simply put, the Plaintiff has never demonstrated
a link between Mr. Rodgers and the fraud he alleged in the Complaint or even a
reasonable belief that such a link existed." (R 455.)
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Because Appellant has failed to satisfy the first prong of the test, his appeal must
fail. This Court should therefore sustain the trial court's ruling, and dismiss the appeal.
3. THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE SUPPORTED BY THE
FACTS.
The trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that because Fay "had absolutely no
legal or factual basis for involving Mr. Rodgers in the action and asserting claims against
him," that Fay had, "directly violated Rule 11 and that sanctions are warranted." (R 456.)
The pertinent portion of Rule 11 is subsection (b):
Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper
to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or advocating), an attorney
or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances ....
The trial court found that Fay had not made a reasonable inquiry. As has been amply
demonstrated in the previous arguments, (some of them by Fay in his own Brief), Fay
ignored information he had before him prior to his filing a Complaint., and made no effort,
what is more, to gather additional information to clarify the status of Rodgers before he
filed his Complaint. Again, he thereafter ignored such information which came to his
attention in letters and depositions which refuted his position after filing his Complaint to
the point of opposing the dismissal of Rodgers immediately prior to trial and then filing
his appeal on the same issues.
Appellant Fay claims that the Attorney General's Office directed him to Mr.
Rodgers. Fay did not, however, make any sort of independent inquiry after supposedly
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being so directed. His self-serving assertion, which is hearsay, has no non-hearsay
support in the record, his Affidavits and the exhibit he did not introduce
Based on facts set forth previously, it is clear that the trial court correctly concluded
Appellant violated Rule 11, not merely when he filed his Complaint, but throughout the
proceedings and on into this very appeal. Mr. Rodgers submits that under the correctionof-error standard, there is no error to correct. Fay has failed the second prong of the test.
His appeal should be dismissed.
4.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
DETERMINED THAT APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO MAKE AN
OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE INQUIRY, AND HIS CONDUCT
THROUGHOUT, CAUSED RODGERS TO INCUR ATTORNEY FEES.
In addition to ignoring the abundant evidence throughout this matter that Mr.

Rodgers has no place in Fay's dispute with Global, Fay asks this Court to find that no
reasonable person could have concluded that his conduct caused Mr. Rodgers to incur
attorney fees. As outlined above, however, Fay willfully failed to make an objectively
reasonable inquiry before filing his Complaint. Because the Attorney General's Office
allegedly referred him to Todd Rodgers, Fay leaped to the unfounded (and somewhat
incoherent) conclusion that "Rodgers was Global." This he did (a) without accessing the
data on the Utah Department of Commerce website, (b) without regard to correspondence
naming Mr. Rodgers as Global's Western District Manager, (c) without inquiring of
Murray City as to whether or not it had issued a business license to Global, and (d)
without a lawyer's reading and understanding of the contract Rodgers signed for Global
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which did not allocate any duty to Rodgers to do anything as part of the settlement.
Based upon these omissions, Fay brought suit against Mr. Rodgers who, as a result, was
required to hire an attorney to defend himself against spurious and specious allegations
that should never have been filed.
Appellant Fay compounded his error when, three weeks after filing his Complaint,
he received a letter from President Scott Nichols, accompanied by a check. The letter
identified Nichols as the President of Global, stated that Mr. Rodgers lacked authority to
sign on the account, and enclosed a check apparently signed by Nichols {supra). This
should have demonstrated to Fay that Mr. Rodgers simply was not a proper target in this
dispute. Undaunted by facts, however, Fay ignored the corroborating information he
acquired in deposing Rodgers and Nichols. Appellant ignored Mr. Rodgers' and Nichols'
testimonies to the effect that Rodgers was an employee of Global, the Utah dba of a
Michigan corporation. Still undeterred by these various facts (all and each of which he
acknowledges knowing), Appellant Fay opposed dismissing Rodgers from the case. At
this point, it should have been clear to Fay that he had no case againsi Rodgers except for
what appears to be a personal vendetta. Irrationally, it was Fay who forced the hearing on
the motion to dismiss Rodgers as a defendant by ignoring the facts before him and
opposing the motion.
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5. APPELLANT'S ARGUMENT THAT THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE
OFFSET THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY FEES UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF
AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES IS WITHOUT MERIT.
Appellant Fay argues that the doctrine of avoidable consequences or mitigation of
damages should have been applied to the sanctions imposed by the trial court because Mr.
Rodgers did not file a motion to dismiss under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (b) (6) or
a motion for a more definite statement under Rule 12 (e). This, however, is something
akin to asking for remittitur of a false imprisonment verdict because the victim could have
kicked down the locked door and escaped, but chose not to. This argument fails for
several reasons.
Fay cites breach-of-contraet cases in support of his argument, ignoring the fact that
the trial court determined sanctions were appropriate because Appellant violated URCP
Rule 11, not because of he breached an agreement with Rodgers. As noted above, there
was no contractual agreement between Rodgers and Fay, only one between Fay and
Global.
The first case cited by Appellant, John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp.,
795 P.2d 678 (Utah App. 1990), is a breach of contract case. Appellant correctly quotes
what the case said about the purpose of the doctrine of mitigation of damages. However,
he fails to point out what the court said about who has the burden. Fortunately, Utah law
is quite clear that "[T]he burden is upon the party whose wrongful act caused the damages
[in this case, Fay] to prove anything in diminution thereof." Pratt v. Board ofEduc, 564
P.2d 294, 298 (Utah 1977).

Since Appellant Fay is the one whose wrongful acts (not
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just one act, but repeated acts, allegations, suit, and appeal) caused the damages, he has
the burden of proving anything in diminution thereof. This, he cannot do.
As set forth above, no matter what evidence Fay had before him prior to filing the
Complaint (and the evidence he could have obtained had he done even a rudimentary
investigation) and no matter what evidence came to as the litigation proceeded, Fay
persisted in his personal war against Todd Rodgers. Notwithstanding an offer to settle
made three weeks following the filing of the Complaint, (see letter of Scott Nichols,
supra) he persisted. Notwithstanding all the information that came to him during the
course of the litigation, he persisted, refusing to alter his position in any way. He has had
every opportunity imaginable to change his course, yet he has persisted with reckless
abandon and dogged determination without regards to the duty imposed not to pursue
parties who are innocent without some justification to believe they may be liable under at
least some theory of law and fact.
Fay argues that Mr. Rodgers should have filed a motion following the filing of Fay's
Complaint. Yet, when Rodgers did file a Motion to Dismiss, Appellant Fay vigorously
opposed it. Despite acknowledging numerous facts justifying Rodgers' motion to
dismiss, Fay would not relent. This, too, was a violation of Rule 11. In essence, Fay is
asking this Court to hold Rodgers responsible for Fay's own ongoing violations of Rule
11.
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In support of his mitigation claim, Fay cites Mahmoodv. Ross:
" "[U]nder the doctrine of avoidable consequences the nonbreaching party has an active
duty to mitigate his damages . . .," 1999 UT 104, f31, 990 P.2d 933 (Utah 1999). Fay
apparently "wants to have his cake and eat it too". He spends the majority of his brief
arguing that the trial court erred in finding him to have breached a duty, which argument,
if accepted, would make him the nonbreaching party, but then attempts to argue that if the
trial court was correct in holding him in violation of Rule 11, that Mr. Rodgers suddenly
has a duty to save Fay himself. Appellant also cites Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App 380,
80 P.3d 553 (Utah App. 2003) for the same proposition. The end result, however, is the
same.
Unlike the cases Fay cites, this case is not about two parties to a contract, one of
whom is in breach. Rule 11 cases involve a breach of duty owed to the court. The
pertinent language is found in Rule 11 (b), which states,
Representations to court. By presenting a pleading, written motion, or other paper
to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or advocating), an attorney
or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances.
Rule 11 ( c ) (2) speaks to the nature of the sanctions. It says,
Nature of sanction; limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall
be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable
conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs
(A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary
nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and
warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to the movant of
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some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and other expenses incurred as a direct
result of the violation.
The foregoing language deals with the duty owed to the court, and the court's power
to fashion sanctions designed to deter repetition of inappropriate representations made to
the court. The first two sanctions listed, directives of a nonmonetary nature, or payment
of a penalty into court, have nothing to do with harm caused to the opposing party, and if
imposed, do nothing to make whole the other party to the litigation. Payment to the other
party to the litigation may only be ordered if the other party files a molion and the court
determines that payment to the moving party will have a deterrent effect. The primary
purpose is to deter inappropriate conduct, not to make the other litigant whole as in a
breach-of-contract case. The concept of "offset" has no place in a Rule 11 deterrence
calculation.
CONCLUSION
Fay failed to take into proper account what he knew before he filed, and he made no
objectively reasonable inquiry with respect to the filing of his Complaint or his
subsequent advocacy before the trial court as to the inclusion of Mr. Todd Rodgers in the
suit, thus violating Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In his appeal, Fay has
not met his burden to marshal the evidence—indeed, he has not even tried. Fay has also
failed to demonstrate any clear error as to the trial court's findings of fact that this Court
should have to correct. He has not shown that no reasonable person could conclude that
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awarding Rodgers attorney fees would have a deterrent effect contemplated by Rule 11.
For any of these reasons, this court should dismiss Appellant's appeal
When, as shown, Appellant has failed at every point of his appeal, and has
perpetuated actions that are in violation of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
this Court, as provided in Rule 33 and Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellant Procedure,
should also award Rodgers costs and attorney fees for having to defend against a totally
deficient appeal. Appellee moves this court to do so.

Respectfully submitted this

/

day of July, 2009.

David R. Maddox
y^
Counsel for Appellee Rodgers
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